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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Eugene Ray Cobell, pro se1, appeals from the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief upon 
remand of the matter for the issuance of a more informative notice of intent to 
dismiss. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts and the proceedings in 
Cobell's underlying criminal case, appeal and initial post-conviction action as 
follows: 
A jury found Cobell guilty of rape and forcible sexual 
penetration by use of a foreign object. In July 2008, the district 
court entered a judgment of conviction and imposed concurrent, 
unified sentences of life, with ten years determinate, for each 
charge. Cobell directly appealed, making several claims: (1) 
violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when the 
prosecutor cross-examined him about his post-Miranda silence; (2) 
prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument where the State 
commented on Cobell's silence after receiving his Miranda rights 
and misstated evidence; (3) cumulative error; and (4) excessive 
sentences. This Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and 
sentences, finding the district court erred by allowing the prosecutor 
Although counsel was originally appointed to represent Cobell in this appeal, 
the Court granted the SAPD's motion to withdraw. (12/30/13 Order Granting 
Motion for Leave to Withdraw and to Suspend Briefing Schedule.) The SAPD's 
request to withdraw as counsel was made following "a thorough review" by three 
separate attorneys of the appellate record in this case who concluded "that the 
appeal failed to present any meritorious issues for review, rendering the appeal 
frivolous." (12/03/13 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Leave to Withdraw and 
Motion to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, p.2.) Additionally, the SAPD is of the 
opinion "that the district court's actions [in summarily dismissing Cobell's 
successive petition for post-conviction relief] were appropriate and that Eugene 
Ray Cobell's petition was properly dismissed." (Id.) 
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to question Cobell regarding his post-Miranda silence, but such 
error was harmless; the prosecutor did not commit misconduct; the 
misstatement of evidence did not rise to the level of fundamental 
error; the slight trial error did warrant the grant of a new trial under 
the cumulative error doctrine; and the sentences were not 
excessive. Thereafter, Cobell filed a petition for post-conviction 
relief. The district court dismissed the petition in June of 2010. A 
decision that Cobell did not appeal. 
Cobell v. State, Docket No. 39321, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 401, pp.1-2 
(Idaho App., March 14, 2013) (footnotes and case citation omitted). 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Successive Post-Conviction 
Proceedings 
The facts of the underlying successive petition for post-conviction relief 
and subsequent appeal are as follows: 
On July 28, 2011, Cobell filed a successive pro se petition 
for post-conviction relief. In his successive petition, Cobell 
asserted the inadvertent omission of key claims and issues in his 
original post-conviction petition was to blame for its dismissal and 
he claimed ineffective assistance of his prior post-conviction 
counsel. Cobell claimed actual innocence due to a medical issue, 
which rendered him incapable of committing the crimes. Cobell 
further claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to 
investigate the medical issue, prosecutorial misconduct at both the 
trial and sentencing, and other claims. Cobell concluded the 
successive petition was an attempt to raise issues that he was not 
given a fair opportunity to present in his original post-conviction 
petition. 
The State moved to dismiss the petition, citing as a ground 
for dismissal Cobell's failure to allege any reason why Cobell's 
claims were not raised in the original petition. The district court 
issued a notice of intent to dismiss wherein it concluded a 
successive petition based on ineffective assistance of prior post-
conviction counsel was without merit. Although Cobell responded 
to the notice of intent to dismiss, the district court issued an order 
summarily dismissing the petition for the reason stated within the 
notice and subsequently entered a judgment. Cobell timely 
appeal[ed]. 
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Cobell, at p.2. 
The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's judgment summarily 
dismissing Cobell's successive petition for post-conviction relief and remanded 
Cobell's case, finding: 
the notice of intent to dismiss to Cobell was inadequate either due 
to an erroneous conclusion that ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel could not provide a sufficient reason to file a 
successive post-conviction petition or due to the failure to identify 
why Cobell's allegations failed to state a sufficient reason to file a 
successive petition or state a claim for relief. 
Cobell, at p.7. The Idaho Supreme court has since rejected this analysis. In 
Murphy v. State, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d _, 2014 WL 717695, *6 (Idaho 
2014), the Idaho Supreme Court held that because there is "no statutory or 
constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel" a claim of 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a "'sufficient reason' for 
filing a successive petition." 
Upon remand, the district court appointed counsel to assist Cobell and 
issued a notice of its intent to dismiss Cobell's successive petition for post-
conviction relief unless Cobell showed a sufficient reason why the claims 
contained in his successive petition were not raised in Cobell's initial petition. 
(R., p.14.) Cobell responded, arguing his own failure to raise issues in his 
original petition and the court's failure to appoint counsel on his original petition 
allowed him to file a successive petition. (See R., pp.16-21.) 
The district court again dismissed Cobell's successive petition for post-
conviction relief, finding "sufficient reason has not been provided to preserve the 
3 
claim(s) petitioner intends to raise in his successive petition." (R., p.25.) Cobell 
timely appealed. (R., pp.27-30.) 
4 
ISSUE 
Cobell's "Informal Brief" does not contain a statement of the issue(s) on 
appeal. The state phrases the issue as: 
Has Cobell failed to carry his appellate burden of showing error in the 
summary dismissal of his successive petition for post-conviction relief? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
Cobell Has Failed To Carry His Appellate Burden Of Showing Error In The 
Summary Dismissal Of His Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Following remand, the district court summarily dismissed Cobell's 
successive petition for post-conviction relief after concluding Cobell failed to 
provide a sufficient reason that would allow him to file a successive petition. (R., 
pp.27-28.) On appeal, Cobell appears to challenge the summary dismissal of his 
petition, however, he has failed to provide any argument or relevant authority to 
support his claim. As a result, Cobell has waived any claim of error. Even if this 
Court reviews the merits of the district court's summary dismissal, there is no 
error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. Cobell Has Waived Appellate Consideration Of His Challenge To The 
District Court's Order Of Summary Dismissal Upon Remand Of His 
Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
Cobell contends on appeal that he is being denied "full and fair access to 
full litigation of a Post Conviction" based on the "one bite of the apple" rationale 
and such denial is "a miscarriage of justice." (Appellant's brief, p.1.) Cobell does 
6 
not argue, however, that the district court erred in determining there was no 
sufficient reason provided to justify the filing of a successive petition for post-
conviction relief. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Nor has Cobell supported his 
appellate claims with any relevant legal authority. (Id.) Cobell has therefore not 
offered any argument, cogent or otherwise, to challenge the district court's 
rulings. It is well settled that a party waives an issue on appeal if either authority 
or argument is lacking. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 
(1996). It is also well settled that the appellate court will not review actions of the 
district court for which no error has been assigned and will not otherwise search 
the record for errors. State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 
(1983). 
Because Cobell has failed on appeal to identify any viable claim of error in 
the district court's actions and has otherwise failed to cite any relevant legal 
authority or make any cogent argument to support any claim of error, he has 
waived appellate review of any such claim and has thereby failed to show any 
error in the summary dismissal of his successive post-conviction petition. 
D. Even If Considered, Cobell Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary 
Dismissal Of His Successive Petition 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction 
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relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain 
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a 
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 
8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and 
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. kl (citing I.C. § 19-
4903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application 
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); 
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application 
for post-conviction relief when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine 
issue of material fact, which if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
applicant to the requested relief. Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979 
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 1999); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 
P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c), a district court 
may dismiss a post-conviction application on the motion of any party when it 
appears that the applicant is not entitled to relief. Specifically, l.C. § 19-4906(c) 
provides: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary 
disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and 
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Even if the Court considers the merits of the district court's summary 
dismissal order, there is no error because the district court summarily dismissed 
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Cobell's petition as being improperly successive. Cobell's petition was correctly 
dismissed on the basis that it failed to satisfy the criteria for a permissible 
successive petition under the UPCPA. Idaho Code § 19-4908 governs the filing 
of successive petitions and provides: 
Waiver of or failure to assert claims. - All grounds for relief 
available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his 
original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally 
adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction 
or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to 
secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, 
unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in 
the original, supplemental, or amended application. 
I.C. § 19-4908. 
In his successive petition, Cobell asserted he should have been able to 
make his new claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the '"sufficient 
reason' that [the district court] erred in denying his motion for the appointment of 
counsel in his original petition." (R., p.23.) Although Cobell asserts a lack of 
legal training and experience in addition to indigency, the court "did not deny the 
appointment of counsel for any reason relating to whether Mr. Cobell was trained 
in the law or 'needy'," but instead because his claims "were plainly frivolous and 
could not be developed into viability even with the assistance of counsel." (Id.) 
Cobell does not contest this finding on appeal and more importantly, Cobell 
fails to explain why, even assuming counsel should have been 
appointed to assist him in the prior proceeding, the absence of 
counsel prevented him from raising the claim in the present petition 
in his previous petition (that is, the claim that trial counsel was 
deficient in failing to raise an impotence defense to the underlying 
charge). 
9 
(R., p.24.) 
The district court correctly dismissed Cobell's petition on the ground that it 
did not meet the statutory requirements for a permissible successive petition 
under I.C. § 19-4908 as the record supports the district court's finding that Cobell 
failed to provide a sufficient reason to file a successive petition for post-
conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Cobell's 
DATED this 
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